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Abstract 
I analyse the effects of a reduction in the tariffs of a trading partner on the exports of 
domestic firms. More precisely, I focus on how cross-industry differences in factor 
intensities and within-industry differences in firm productivities shape the response of the 
extensive (decision to export) and the intensive (exported volumes per firm) margins of 
exports. I examine the response of French firms to the reduction of Turkish import tariffs 
that followed the entry of Turkey into the European Customs Union in 1996. A reduction in 
tariffs increases the probability to export and, surprisingly, the effect is stronger in 
comparatively disadvantaged sectors. I provide a possible explanation using a partial 
equilibrium model which includes firm-level heterogeneity and sector-level comparative 
advantage. In this model, as trade partner tariffs fall, the productivity threshold separating 
exporters from non-exporters decreases more in comparatively disadvantaged sectors. This 
occurs because, even if the productivity threshold to enter the export market falls in the same 
proportion as tariffs in all sectors, its level was initially higher in comparatively 
disadvantaged ones. 
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* Bank of Italy, Economics, Research and International Relations.    1 Introduction1
How do rms react to a reduction in export taris? Is it that more non exporters begin to
export (extensive margin) or that rms that were already exporting increase their shipped sales
(intensive margin)? How do comparative advantages shape the response of these two margins?
The goal of this paper is to provide a description of rm's response to a marginal change in
export taris. In doing this I consider the main forces that recent heterogeneous rm literature
and standard neoclassical theory point out to explain trade: rm-level productivity and sector-
level comparative advantage. The rm-heterogeneity literature, started with Melitz (2003),
shows that only the most productive rms export, and, as taris decrease, the more productive
non-exporters begin to export2. However neoclassical literature extensively uses sector charac-
teristics, and the key concept of comparative advantage, to explain and study trade. Extending
the rm heterogeneity model allowing for dierences in sector characteristics, or, from the other
perspective, relaxing the hypothesis of homogeneous-rms in models that explain trade through
sector dierences seems the natural direction of trade literature. Very few papers begin to ad-
dress this issue. None of them provide an empirical analysis of the interaction between sector
comparative advantage and rm-heterogeneity. This is the main contribution of this paper.
I provide answers to the questions outlined above by analyzing the response of French
rms to the reduction in Turkish taris which followed the entry of Turkey in the European
Customs Union in 1996. I focus on France because it is provided with very detailed rm-level
data. The data sets I use, collected at INSEE, report information on French rms' balance-
sheet characteristics and on their export sales to each foreign country. I can thus observe the
characteristics of those rms, among 60.000 rms within 60 manufacturing sectors, who export
precisely to Turkey in the years around the Customs Union formation.
I nd that the Customs Union formation had a huge impact on French aggregate export to
Turkey, which increased by 40% between 1995 and 1996 and by 80% between 1995 and 1999.
About the 60% of the former increase is accounted by the average shipped volumes (intensive
margin) and the remaining 40% by the number of French exporters (extensive margin) to
Turkey. These results are specic to Turkey: French exports to the rest of the world in that
same period (1995-1999) increased by 16% only.
I turn to study the rm-level export-market participation. The empirical identication of
the impact of a reduction in variable trade costs on French rms' export behavior is based on
a generalized dierence in dierence methodology where the source of variation is the change
in Turkish taris across time and industries. On this margin I nd that a 1 percentage-points
decrease of Turkish import taris increased the probability of a French rm to export to Turkey
by 0.042 percentage-points. The result above changes if we take into account capital (skill)
intensity of French sectors. In fact, the probability of exporting to Turkey for French rm
increases by 0.135 percentage points in the top 1st percentile of labor-intensive sectors and
by 0.012 percentage points in the bottom 75th percentile of labor-intensive ones. Thus, the
extensive margin is more reactive for sectors without comparative advantage as taris decrease.
1I am grateful to Jaume Ventura, Paula Bustos and Gino Gancia for their guidance and support and to
S ebastien Roux, Pauline Givord and Didier Blanchet who allowed me to conduct research at INSEE. For helpful
suggestions and comments, I also would like to thank Mikl os Koren, Diego Puga, Massimo Sbracia, Rub en
Segura-Cayuela and many seminar partecipants. The views expressed are those of the author and do not
necessarily reects those of INSEE or Banca d'Italia.
2See Chaney (2008) for an extension of the model.
5This nding is puzzling if we have in mind a neoclassical model of comparative advantage,
that predicts that each country specializes and thus exports mostly in sectors with comparative
advantage.
I control for potential sources of bias of my results. First, time xed eects take account
of dierences in export-market participation over time. Second, the main concern on taris
coecient could be that taris are correlated with industry characteristics. By introducing
time-invariant industry xed eects at the same level of taris I control for this potential
bias. Third, taris coecient may be biased if taris and rm characteristics are correlated: if
French sectors which export big volumes to Turkey are very concentrated, then Turkey could
have set industry taris considering French rms' specic characteristics. I address this issue by
introducing rms' xed eects. Finally the generalized dierence in dierence approach could
not account for time-varying industry trends which, in turn, may be correlated with taris.
To address this issue I perform a set of control-experiments that consist in using as dependent
variable the probability of French rms to export to other destinations or blocks of destinations,
like Morocco, China, Italy, Romania, Russia, Hungary, Algeria, the entire world and the entire
world except Turkey. If my results on Turkey come from time-varying industry trends which
are spuriously correlated with import Turkish taris change, then those control experiments
should deliver the same results I found for Turkey. This is not the case, thus conrming the
robustness of my results.
For what concerns the intensive margin, I nd that a decrease of Turkish taris by 1
percentage-point increases the shipped ows to Turkey at existing French exporters by 3%
on average and by more in labor-intensive sectors. Albeit results on the intensive margin are
big in magnitude, they are not robust to the inclusion of time xed-eects. This may be the
case if exporters were sensitive to the entry of Turkey in European Customs Union but not
specically to the reduction in taris. In fact, since I include the exported ows by each rm to
other destinations, Turkish taris capture the remaining eect of time xed-eects on Turkey's
ows. Thus my tentative conclusion is that the intensive margin reacted to Customs Union but
through channels dierent from taris, like the harmonization in technical regulations and cus-
toms classication rules which were endorsed by the same policy event. Also for the intensive
margin, the eect was surprisingly bigger for labor-intensive sectors.
In order to rationalize these surprising results, I build a model that combines the follow-
ing ingredients: rm level heterogeneity within each industry, comparative advantage at the
industry level, a xed cost and a variable trade cost to export which captures the movement
of taris. In this partial equilibrium environment France and Turkey trade in a continuum of
sectors, each sector uses two production factors with dierent intensities, rms are heteroge-
neous within each sector and there are xed and variable costs to trade. As in the standard
Heckscher-Ohlin model, capital-intensive sectors enjoy a cost advantage when located in France,
since its capital/labour ratio is higher than in Turkey. As in the Melitz (2003) model, only rms
with productivity above a threshold enter the export market since they are productive enough
to cover costs to export. The export threshold is lower for comparative advantage sectors, since
rms in these sectors enjoy a cost advantage given by the relative lower cost of production's
factors used intensively. Thus, even with high taris rms in comparative advantage sectors
have a higher probability of exporting than rms with the same productivity level in sectors
with no comparative advantage.
As trade partner taris fall, the productivity threshold to export decreases by more in less
comparative advantage industries and, as a result, the probability to enter the market increases
6by more for rms in these industries. This is the case because, even if the cut-o productivity
to enter the export market falls in the same proportion as taris in all sectors, its level was
initially higher in less comparative advantage sectors. This is consistent with my empirical
ndings.
On the intensive margin the result is opposite. The eect of partner's taris reduction on
revenue is bigger for rms that initially exported more, the ones in comparative advantage
industries. This is the case because, as in the standard one-sector model, rm's revenues
elasticity to taris is greater than one. This result comes from the monopolistic competition
assumption and from the love of variety utility. My empirical results on this margin are not
completely consistent with the ones in this model.
The model I propose is related to Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) one. They study
a general equilibrium economy with two countries that dier in factor abundance, two sectors
which dier in factor intensities and heterogeneous rms within each sector. Their model is built
in a general equilibrium framework and does not clearly assess the mechanism I am interested
in, since many results are simulated. My contribution in this sense has been to reconcile the
theory to my specic case-study and pin down a clear mechanism through which theory can
account for my puzzling results on the extensive margin.
The ndings in this paper are related to empirical studies on rms and trade liberalization,
rm-level intensive and extensive margin and trade and comparative advantage.
First, there are many papers that use rm-level data to analyze rms that trade. Many of
them analyze the characteristics of rms that export without considering a trade liberalization
episode (Bernard and Jensen (1997), Aw and Hwang (1995) among others 3). Others study how
trade liberalization induces a change within each rm (Bustos 2007, Bustos 2008 for technology
adoption, Pavnick (2002), Schor (2004) among others for productivity upgrading, Treer (2004)
analyzes dierent outcomes for Canadian sectors). Finally few papers analyze the choice of
rms to export after a reduction in trade costs, albeit using a change in import taris to
identify their empirical strategy, like Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006) for US between 1987
and 1997. Dierently from previous papers I use a change in export taris to estimate rms
export choices. Bustos (2008) uses a similar policy change and estimates the entry into export
market for Argentinean rms after the reduction of Brazilian taris induced by the formation
of Mercosur. She nds that a 1 percentage-point reduction of Brazilian import taris increases
the probability to export for Argentinean rms of 0.42 percentage-points. Her result is much
higher in magnitude than mine. The dierence could arise from an over-representation of bigger
rms in Argentinean data set or from dierences in macro-characteristics (like industrialization
level) between Argentina and France.
Second, the intensive and extensive margins of trade at rm level have been analyzed by
Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz (2004) in French rm data set for 1986. They estimate how
the number of exporters and the average exports by rm explain the cross-country variation
of French exports in one year. They nd that the number of rms capture a bigger part of
that variation. Dierently from them, I use a dynamic framework and I calculate how the two
trade margins account for the change in French export after a policy episode which features a
decrease in trade barriers.
3See also Clerides, Lach and Tybout (1998); Bernard and Jensen (1999); Bernard, Jensen, Redding and
Schott (2007); Mayer and Ottaviano (2007).
7Third, on the comparative advantage side, the empirical literature has mainly analyzed the
neoclassical theories by testing predictions on the content of trade that these models feature,
but without considering the specic eect of a change in taris on sector marginal reaction,
which models like standard Heckscher-Ohlin could not predict. An improvement of neoclassical
models in this direction has been made by Romalis (2004) who analyzes a trade model which
features endowment comparative advantage in a monopolistic competition framework. The
prediction he gets is that countries capture larger shares of world trade in sectors that use
their abundant factor more intensively. However, even if the model features the existence of
variable trade costs to export, there are no clear predictions when taris decrease. Moreover
his model can not have predictions on the extensive and intensive trade margins, since rms are
homogeneous. From a theoretical perspective the key of my contribution in this direction lies
on the fact that I consider a marginal eect of trade on the response of sectors with dierent
comparative advantage more than an average eect, like all other papers do. The main concerns
of this literature is to analyze what happens when a closed economy becomes open, my point of
view relies on observing what happens when an open economy becomes more open. Moreover,
my empirical contribution is unique in this direction.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes the timing of Turkey's
entry in European Customs Union and provides a descriptive analysis of French reaction along
the intensive and the extensive margins. In Section 2 I illustrate a model that accounts for
rm heterogeneity and sector comparative advantage. In section 3 I describe the data and the
variables of interest. Section 4 deals with the econometric strategy and the empirical results.
Section 5 concludes.
2 Preliminary Analysis of EU-Turkey Customs Union
2.1 A brief background
Turkey's rst application for European Community (EC) membership dates back to July
1959, followed by the signing of the Ankara Association Agreement. This agreement specied
the three stages through which Turkey would prepare for full membership of the Community:
a preparatory stage aimed at helping Turkey to develop its economy, a transitional stage aimed
at reaching the Customs Union and a potential third stage to eventually bring Turkey to full
membership.
In the preparatory stage, which lasted ve years, the EC gave unilateral concessions to Turkey
in the form of agricultural tari quotas and direct nancial aid to help Turkey to develop its
economy. At this stage Turkey didn't have to change its trade regime, which was very inward
looking.
The transition stage was meant to last from 12 to 22 years and to culminate with the
formation of a Customs Union (CU) between the two parties. According to the Additional
Protocol of 1973 (which gave practical details on the way to reach the Customs Union) the EC
would have to reduce taris and equivalent protection measures during the '70s. Turkey was
assigned a longer transitional period between 12 and 22 years to reduce taris and to harmonize
its standards to the EC ones. EC countries soon accomplished their requirements by abolishing
taris and equivalent taxes and restrictions on industrial imports from Turkey, though with
8some strategic exceptions (machine woven carpets, cotton yarn and cotton textiles)4. Turkey
did not manage to comply with its required taris reduction due to political and economic
instability. After the Cyprus crises of 1974 and the military "golpe" of 1980 EU-Turkey relations
was interrupted and the agreement was economically and politically broken up.
During the'80s, however, Turkey successfully managed to begin a liberalization process and
to experience an economic growth. In 1987 it re-applied for EU membership. At this time
EC was dealing with the completion of internal market, so negotiations began only in 1993,
and nalized on the 6th March 1995 with the Association Council decision that Turkey would
enter the European Customs Union, starting on January the 1st, 1996. However, according
to the Maastricht Treaty, the agreement had to be ratied by the European Parliament, and
that ratication was not granted due to concerns over Turkey's human right's records. After
lobbying and pressures from dierent institutions the Parliament ratied the agreement in
December 1995 and the CU came into force in January 1996.
According to the Customs Union Decision (CUD) of the 6th March 1995 the extent of the
CU was the following5 :
 Turkey had to eliminate all taris, customs duties, quantitative restrictions, charges hav-
ing equivalent eect to customs duties and all measures having equivalent eect to quan-
titative restrictions in trade of industrial goods with EU starting from January the 1st,
1996;
 Turkey had to adopt the Common Customs Tari (CCT) against third countries' imports
by the same date and adopt all the EU preferential agreements with third countries by
2001;
 Common agricultural policy (CAP) was not included in the CUD;
 the "European Coal and Steel Community" (ECSC) products, basically iron and steel, was
exempted from the CU. However in 1996 Turkey and EU signed a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) to let these goods circulate freely after three years;
 Turkey would have to work toward the harmonization of competition policy, intellectual
and industrial property rights, customs classication rules, valuation, rules of origin,
technical regulations, standards and government procurements;
 Finally two important issues remained out of the CUD: the supply of service and the
(freely) circulation of capital and labor.
2.2 Elimination of the trade barriers: aggregate and sector response
What has been the real extent on the trade barriers elimination provided by EU-Turkey CU?
Since it is hard to quantify the eect of the CU on non-taris barriers and policy harmonization,
we can use the reduction in Turkish eectively applied taris toward EU, available in TRAINS-
WTO data set, to proxy for all the other changes. According to this source of information
4However, EC countries continued to apply quotas and minimum import price which were within the frame-
work of the Common Agricultural Policy and also non-tari barriers against some goods (e.g. textiles, iron and
steel, raisins, fresh fruit and vegetables) remained high.
5This section borrows from Erdogan (2002), Togan (1995), Togan (1997).
9Turkish import taris decrease consistently after the CU even if they were not set to "0" by
1999. The variation of eectively applied taris is shown in Figure 1 for all sectors and for all
sectors excluding "Food, Beverages and Tobacco". If we exclude this sector, Turkey import
taris against EU decreased from an average of 7.88% in 1995 to 4.65% in 1999. Moreover the
variation of taris among sectors remained quite high: the standard deviation in taris in 1999
was around 4.60. Including the "Food, Beverages and Tobacco" sector the average variation of
taris went from 9.80% in 1995 to 7.80% in 1999.
Figure 1: Change in Turkish import taris after the entrance in EU Customs Union: all sectors
(left) and all sectors excluding "Food, Beverages and Tobacco" (right)
In this paper I use this reduction of Turkish taris to explore the response of French
rms. French Statistical Agency-INSEE collects very detailed data on French rm balance
sheet (BRN data set), and, more importantly, on French rm export sales to dierent des-
tinations (DOUANE data set). This helps me in dissecting the eect of taris reduction on
rm export choice by considering exactly those rms that export to Turkey (and not to any
destination), in the years around the CU 6.
In the rest of this section I report preliminary ndings on the substantial change of French
exports to Turkey, before and after the CU. I then show how the aggregate increase in French
export to Turkey can be explained by an increase in the number of exporters: the extensive
margin and ows by exporter: the intensive margin of trade. I then propose the same decompo-
sition at sector level, obtaining puzzling results with respect to sector capital intensity margin.
The aim of this analysis is to describe in a detailed way the eect of CU on French exports and
to indicate a few eects which I further analyze in the rest of the paper.
The entry of Turkey in the European Customs Union aected French exports quite strongly.
Between 1995 and 1996 (the year of entry) France increased its exports to Turkey by 40% and
by 20% between 1995 and 1999, as shown in Table 1. Compared with the growth in exports to
Turkey in the years before CU (2%) or with the growth in exports to the rest of the world in the
same period (-1% in 1996 and 4% between 1995 and 1999), the huge eect seems to come from
6The years I consider go from 1995 to 1999, since all the data sets I combine have information for these years
only.
10Percentage growth rate of French export to...
94-95 95-96 95-99
Turkey: total 0.02 0.40 0.80
Turkey: number of rms 0.13 0.16 0.21
Turkey: average quantity -0.11 0.24 0.60
ROW: total 0.10 -0.01 0.16
ROW: number of rms 0.012 -0.007 -0.04
ROW: average quantity 0.088 -0.003 0.21
Table 1: Decomposition 1 of Total French Exports to Turkey and to the Rest Of the World.
the formation of the CU. The aggregate French export growth to Turkey may be decomposed

















where the rst part is a proxy of the intensive margin7 and the second refers to the extensive
margin (the change in number of exporters.). The interest of the literature in this decomposition
is not only descriptive, but also normative since the extensive margin is a proxy for product
varieties8 and a large fraction of trade models9 predict that the number of varieties increases
welfare.
Both margins explain trade between countries, but the literature still lacks a quantication
of the movements of these margins following a liberalization episode. Eaton, Kortum and
Kramarz (2004) estimate those extensive and intensive margins for French exports towards the
rest of the world in 1986. They nd that the extensive margin explains a bigger fraction of
the aggregate French exports. By applying decomposition 1 I nd that almost the 40% of the
total growth in exports to Turkey is explained by the increase in the number of exporters while
a 60% is explained by the increase in average ows. The same decomposition for exports to
all other destinations in the same years, reported in Table 1, reveals that, in those cases, the
extensive margin explains a smaller part of the growth in total exports.
Even if many French rms entered Turkey after the CU, they exported very small quanti-
ties. We can decompose the aggregate French growth rate to Turkey according to a dierent
perspective by considering the change in export ows for continuing exporters (which I indi-
cate with STAY) and the change in export ows given by the entry-exit dynamic (indicated as
NET-ENTRY)10:
7In the empirical analysis I consider the intensive margin at the rm level: the shipped ows of incumbents.
In decomposition (1) instead I consider a proxy for the intensive margin which contains both the ows by
incumbents and the ows by new entrants (as well as the ows by exited rms).
8Under the hypothesis that each rm produces a dierent variety of goods, like all models with monopolistic
competition suggest.
9Basically all models with love-of-variety utility function and monopolistic competition structure, from Krug-
man (1980) on.
10The nding that new entrants tend to export small quantities compared to continuing exporters seem to be
























1994-1995 12.90 0.02 -0.79 3.43 -1.64 1.79
1995-1996 421.80 0.49 0.9 0.17 -0.7 0.1
1996-1997 276.00 0.22 0.92 0.19 -0.11 0.08
1997-1998 84.50 0.05 0.87 0.55 -0.41 0.13
1998-1999 267.20 0.16 1.07 0.17 -0.24 -0.07
Note: rst column in millions of Francs












Table 2 reports results for decomposition 2 for dierent years as well as the export change
in levels (in column 1). The change in exported sales to Turkey between 1995 and 1996 was of
422 million francs (almost 64 million of euros) which is a huge quantity compared to the change
in previous years. Almost 90% of this change came from an increase in exports by rms which
were already exporting (column 3), while 17% was the exported sales by newly exporting rms
and 10% by the rm exit-entry dynamic. In levels, the entry-exit margin refers to almost 43
million francs between 1995 and 1996, almost the double than the 23 millions francs between
1994 and 1995.
In Table 3 I report Decomposition (1) and (2) at the sector level using 2-digit NES classi-
cation, the one used at INSEE 11 . The sectors are ordered by increasing capital intensity12.
Here I have in mind neoclassical trade theory and the main concept of endowment comparative
advantage. According to neoclassical theories each country specializes in those sectors which
use relatively more intensively those factors the country is relatively more endowed with. As
the French capital/labour ratio is higher than the Turkish one, neoclassical theory suggests
that France should export capital intensive goods to Turkey and import labor intensive goods
from Turkey. Even if existing models do not account for the movement of the extensive and the
intensive margin across sectors with dierent degree of comparative advantage, I expect that
both margins should react more in capital intensive sectors, the one in which France enjoy a
comparative advantage with respect to Turkey13 .
Surprisingly, results in Table 3 show this is not the case. The total export growth and
the intensive margin vary a lot among dierent sectors in 1996 and they do not seem to be
correlated with sector capital intensity. The margins of the second decomposition (columns (4)
and (5)) are also very volatile across sectors and their movement does not seem to be associated
with sector capital intensity. The movement along the extensive margin, instead, presents a
puzzling kind of regularity: it grew a lot in labor-intensive sectors like Apparel, Textile and
11The 2-digit NES classication consists in 15 manufacturing sectors while the 3-digit one consists in 60
manufacturing sectors. This is the maximum disaggregation available.
12Capital Intensity is calculated from NBER-US data. As I will explain in further section this refers to the
"optimal capital intensity" of each sector and not to the actual capital intensity in French sectors even if the
two measures are positively correlated.
13According to the standard HO model only comparative advantage sectors export, thus all the eects of a
trade liberalization should be observable only in these sectors.
12Decomposition 1 Decomposition 2
TOTAL AVERAGE NUMBER STAY NET ENTRY
Total 0.40 0.24 0.16 0.90 0.10
by 2-digit NES sector
Apparel, Textile and Leather Products 0.81 0.40 0.41 0.70 0.30
Furniture and Fixture 0.27 -0.05 0.32 0.82 0.18
Printing and Publishing 0.45 0.23 0.22 0.52 0.48
Paper, Lumber and Wood Products 0.02 -0.19 0.22 3.36 -2.36
Transportation Equipment 1.29 1.29 0.00 1.003 -0.003
Textile Mill Products 0.06 -0.13 0.19 0.85 0.15
Mechanic Equipment 0.55 0.45 0.11 0.82 0.18
Electric and Electronic Equipment 0.13 0.14 -0.02 0.28 0.72
Electric and Electronic Components 0.38 0.26 0.12 0.88 0.12
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 1.12 1.06 0.06 1.04 -0.04
Mineral Products (Stone, Clay, Glass Products) 0.51 0.29 0.23 0.96 0.04
Chemicals and Allied Products 0.27 0.21 0.06 0.90 0.10
Fabricated Metal Products 0.57 0.32 0.24 0.79 0.21
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 0.02 -0.04 0.07 0.67 0.33
Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners 0.20 0.13 0.07 0.98 0.02
Table 3: Decomposition 1 and 2 of Total French Export to Turkey by Increasing Capital Inten-
sity Industries for year 1995-1996.
Leather Products or Furniture and Fixture while it grew very slowly in capital-intensive sectors
like Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners14.
In what follows I mention two possible explanations for this ndings which are not supported
by descriptive analysis.
A rst reason may be the existence of "outsourcing": after the reduction of Turkish taris
more French rms export to Turkey intermediate goods and import back nal goods. If this
was the case we should observe an increase of the number of French importers from Turkey
in the same period in labor-intensive sectors. Table 4 shows this is not the case, in fact total
imports from Turkey increased only by 6% in the same year of the Customs Union15 and the
extensive margin reacted more in capital-intensive sectors.
A second reason may be a productivity change within French rms in the same years of CU.
Recent models of trade suggest that more productive rms are the ones that export. It may be
the case that French rms, in the same years I am analyzing, upgrade their productivity in some
sectors while not in others and this is driving previous nding. At a rst sight, gure 2 shows
this is not the case. In these gure I plot for sectors with very dierent capital intensity their
rms' productivity distribution16(in the left hand side panel of each gure) and the estimated
14This nding is true also controlling for the total number of rms in each sector. The probability of French
rms to export to Turkey (measured as number of exporters over total number of active rms in each sector) is
higher for rms in capital intensive sectors (Drugs and Soaps, Chemicals, Electric Components), but increased
by more in less capital intensive ones after the Customs Union.
15The huge Turkish import growth rate in 1996 has been documented in some case studies. Erdogdu (2002) for
example noticed that "Since the EU had already abolished its taris from imports from Turkey, the Customs
Union did not bring about a signicant liberalization of Turkish exports to the EU. On the contrary, the
dismantlement of trade barriers in favor of the EU led to a surge in imports from Europe, culminating in steep
rise in Turkey's trade decit with EU in 1996".
16TFP is calculated according to Olley and Pakes (1996) as I will explain in further section.
13TOTAL INTENSIVE EXTENSIVE
Total 0.06 -0.07 0.13
by sector
Apparel, Textile and Leather Products 0.13 0.04 0.09
Furniture and Fixture 0.47 0.40 0.06
Printing and Publishing -0.70 -0.11 -0.59
Paper and Allied Products, Lumber and Wood Products 0.13 0.30 -0.17
Transportation Equipment 0.16 0.16 0.00
Textile Mill Products -0.12 -0.21 0.08
Mechanic Equipment 0.69 0.35 0.34
Electric and Electronic Equipment 0.06 -0.38 0.44
Electric and Electronic Components 0.27 -0.09 0.36
Food, Beverages and Tobacco -0.25 -0.29 0.04
Mineral Products (Stone, Clay and Glass Products) -0.17 -0.61 0.44
Chemicals and Allied Products -0.02 -0.05 0.03
Fabricated Metal Products 0.13 -0.20 0.33
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 0.28 0.11 0.17
Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners 1.35 1.62 -0.27
Table 4: Decomposition 1 for Total French Import from Turkey by Increasing Capital Intensity
Industries for year 1995-1996.
probability of exporting for each productivity level (in the right hand side panel) for the period
before and after the CU (1994-1995 vs 1996-1999). While rms' productivity distributions did
not change very much in the two periods, the probability of exporting increased a lot after the
1996 for rms in "Apparel, Textile and Leather Products" for each level of TFP. The same is
not true for other sectors like "Drugs and Cleaners" one for example.17.
Figure 2: Productivity distribution and probability to export for dierent sectors
This description of French export to Turkey in the years around the entry of Turkey in CU
showed that:
1. the growth rate of aggregate French exports to Turkey was huge;
17I do not report graphs for other sectors since they are consistent with ndings in Table 3.
142. it was due to an increase in the number of French exporters to Turkey (albeit they begin to
export very small quantities) and to an increase in shipped volumes at incumber exporters.
The second eect is higher in magnitude than the rst;
3. the entry of new French exporters to Turkey was higher in labor-intensive sectors, the
ones in which France does not enjoy a comparative advantage with respect to Turkey.
In the rest of the paper I describe a model in which French rms could export or not to
Turkey depending on their characteristics, on the level of Turkish import taris and on the
comparative advantage their sector enjoys with respect to Turkey.
This framework claries that in a standard model that allows for asymmetries in the initial
level of the main variables, we can generate the preliminary nding on the extensive margin
discussed before. The key to the result lies in the fact that the model analyzes an open economy
which becomes more open, so the main eect it captures works at the margin and not at the
average. The predictions of the model are then formally tested.
3 The model
In this section I sketch a model with standard assumptions on demand and supply that
predicts reactions at the rm-sector margin. I consider a continuum of sectors and a continuum
of rms inside each sector. The heterogeneity of rms is introduced as in Melitz (2003): rms
dier by an exogenous productivity. The heterogeneity of sectors is introduced similarly to a two
factors Heckscher-Ohlin model18: each sector has a higher comparative advantage with respect
to the trade partner if it uses more intensively the factor its country is more endowed with.
Each country has a dierent capital-labor ratio (or skilled-unskilled ratio) and each sector uses
a dierent share of each factor to produce. In this economy the asymmetry among countries is
given by factor endowment; the asymmetry across sectors is given by factor intensities and the
asymmetry across rms within sectors is given by exogenous productivity. However the rms'
productivity distribution is the same across sectors and countries19.
The assumptions of the model are the followings:
 There are two countries that only dier on factor abundance, skilled and unskilled work-
ers20 : Turkey (T) is less skill-abundant with respect to France (F);
 Consumers have Cobb-Douglas preferences over dierent sectors goods and CES prefer-
ences over goods within each sector;
 There is a continuum of sectors i 2 (0;1) which use skilled and unskilled workers with
a Cobb-Douglas technology. Technology is the same across countries and time. The
index i ranks industries by relative factor intensity: industries with higher i are more skill
intensive;
18See Dornbush, Fisher and Samuelson (1980) for the standard Heckscher-Ohlin model with a continuum of
goods.
19Bernard, Redding and Schott (2007) build a general equilibrium model with two countries, two production
factors, two sectors and heterogeneous rms within each sector. The following model, described in a partial
equilibrium environment, can thus be considered a simplied version of their model with a continuity of sectors.
20Alternatively the two factors could be capital and labor.
15 The two factors, inelastically supplied, are mobile within country but not across them,
thus skilled and unskilled wages are equalized across sectors in each country;
 In each sector there is a continuum of rms, ! 2 (0;1). Each rm has an exogenous
productivity which does not change through time. Each sector has the same rms' pro-
ductivity distribution;
 Each rm in each sector produce a dierent good using the same factor proportion as
other rms in its sector and its own specic productivity;
 Firms compete in a monopolistic competition environment;
 There is no entry nor exit of rms from the domestic market in each country;
 There are variable and xed costs to export (thus all rms produce for the domestic
market and only some of them export);
 Wages are taken as given: the reduction of import taris in Turkey does not aect French
labor market and viceversa.
These assumptions seem reasonable. First, France only exports to Turkey the 1% of its
total production21, thus the partial equilibrium framework is a good environment to study
the trade between these two countries. Second, the Customs Union did not allow for labor
and capital movements between Turkey and European countries. As a consequence, the skill-
premium dierence between Turkey and France remained positive after the taris reduction.
Finally, this Customs Union consisted mainly in the reduction of Turkey's import taris. French
import taris from Turkey had already been low since the 1970s. This allows me to abstract
from the increasing competition from Turkey to France and, as a consequence, from entry/exit
dynamics in French domestic market22.
The formal description of French economy, under previous hypotheses assumptions, is de-





















where Ei = biY is the fraction of income each consumer spends in goods of industry i;
 = 1
1  is the constant elasticity of substitution greater than 1 (being 0 <  < 1), Pi is the
Price Index for sector i and pi(!) is the price of good ! in sector i.
21As will be shown in a later section.
22In fact, as we saw in previous section, the French exports to Turkey grew by 40% between 1995 and 1996
while the French imports from Turkey increased by 6% in the same period: 421 millions of Francs against 14
million of Francs respectively.
23The sub-index F, indicating France, is omitted when it is possible without creating confusion.











i represents the exogenous mass of available goods in sector i.
Firms compete in a monopolistic competition environment. The output of each industry
consists of a number of varieties that are imperfect substitutes for one another. Each variety is
produced by a rm with a productivity level denoted by '. In each sector and in each country
the distribution of rms' productivity is the same and is denoted by ('). All rms produce
for domestic market and only some of them export. From now on I focus only on the costs,
revenues and prots earned from export, being the domestic ones completely standard. The









L;F if ^ qi(') > 0
0 otherwise
(6)
In the total-costs function, ^ qi(') is the supplied quantity, fi;x is the xed cost the rm pays
to sell in the foreign market, i is the skill-factor intensity in sector i and wS;F and wL;F are
French skilled- and unskilled- workers wages respectively.
Notice that i is higher for sectors which use more intensively skilled workers, that is for
sectors that are ranked with a higher i. Since France is more skill-endowed than Turkey, the
sectors located in France with higher i have a higher comparative advantage degree with
respect to Turkey. Thus i is the theoretical measure of comparative advantage.









where i;T is a standard iceberg trade cost that captures the tari imposed by Turkey on
sector i's goods from France.




























 1   fi;x (9)
The open economy version of the Price Index in Turkey can be written as:
P
1 
i;T = NT [pi;d;T(~ 'T)]
1  + Ni;x;F [i;Tpi;d;F(~ 'i;x;F)]
1  (10)


























17that is an average of the prices of all the goods sold in Turkey (both produced in Turkey
and imported from France) weighted by their numbers. In particular we can easily distinguish
goods produced and sold in Turkey (the rst addend) and goods imported from France (the
second addend). NT and Ni;x;F are respectively the number of goods (or of rms) produced
and sold by each sector in Turkey and the number of goods imported from France. While ~ 'T
and ~ 'i;x;F are the average productivity of Turkish rms and that of French rms which produce
for the Turkish market. Notice that ~ 'T is constant across sectors24; on the contrary ~ 'i;x;F is




































































is a measure of the degree of competition between French exporters and Turkish domestic
rms in Turkey. Since Turkey pre-liberalization taris were high and the number of French
exporters was low compared to domestic producers, I analyze the case of a low degree of
competition, in particular when
Zx;F

























ZT1  is a constant and SPF =
wS;F
wL;F is the skill-premium in France
(or in Turkey when indicated by a T).
24It is so because all rms in this model produce for their respective domestic market and we are assuming
that all sectors share the same productivity distribution.
25This assumption can be relaxed and results are valid after more cumbersome algebra and under coecients
restrictions.
18A rm exports only if its productivity is high enough to cover x and variable export costs
and have non-negative prots. By setting Equation (13) equal to zero we obtain the exporting
threshold. This is the minimum level of productivity that a French rm in a given sector needs
















where, in the second equality, all the constant terms have been replaced by Di;T. All rms
with productivity higher than 'i;x;F do export.
Equation (15) shows how the exporting-threshold varies according to taris and comparative
advantage for given x costs to export, foreign expenditure and productivity distribution.
Export threshold and per-rm revenue give us information on the way the probability of
exporting and export ows react in dierent sectors as Turkey decreases its taris toward
France.
Equation (15) implies that the threshold decreases when taris decrease and comparative
advantage increases26. As expected a tari liberalization increases the probability of exporting
in all sectors, given comparative advantage (as in Melitz); the probability of exporting is higher
for comparative advantage sectors given taris (HO intuition). However as the starting thresh-
old is higher for non-comparative advantage sectors, a marginal taris reduction will aect by
more the threshold in non-comparative advantage sectors. As a consequence the probability of
exporting of rms in those sectors will also be more aected. The three results are summarized










It is worth emphasizing that in this exercise I analyze the change from an open to a more
open economy. In recent liberalization episodes it is hard to argue that we observe a transition
between autarchy and open economy. This was denitely not the case of France and Turkey
since even before Customs Union there was bilateral trade in all sectors.
The intensive margin, namely the change in ows by continuing exporters, is captured












(ri;x;F(');i;T) = 1    < 0
As in Melitz (2003) I nd that revenues increase with a decrease in taris. Similarly to HO,
revenues are higher in comparative advantage sectors given rm productivity level and taris.
26It is so because France is more endowed with skilled workers, its skill-premium is lower than the Turkish
one, thus the ratio of skill-premiums is lower than 1.
27The full derivation is shown in Appendix A.
28I consider changes in revenues instead of changes in shipped quantities to be consistent with data.
19Finally the eect of trade liberalization is higher for comparative advantage sectors as the cross
derivative shows. The intuition of this result comes from the "Krugman" part of the model: the
monopolistic competition hypothesis. Demand for goods depends more than proportionally on
prices (through ). The price is inversely proportional to productivity and directly proportional
to taris. When the price decreases (through a reduction in taris) demand increases more than
proportionately. This inates revenues. Since revenues in sectors with a comparative advantage
were already high, their level will increase by more than their counterpart in sectors with no
comparative advantage.
The predictions obtained on the extensive and the intensive margins are at the rm-level.
However we could obtain sector-level predictions as well. For example, the rm-level prediction
on the probability of each rm to export becomes the sector-level prediction on the proportion
of French exporters to Turkey. Some previous papers use a rm heterogeneity model to test
sector-level predictions 29. By doing this however we could incur in problems both at the
theoretical and at the empirical level. To obtain sector-level predictions we need to aggregate
rm-level productivity at the sector-level. This is usually done in the literature using a Pareto
distribution function, which has been argued to well represent rm size distribution30. However,
depending on the chosen distribution function, this aggregation could change the direction of
some theoretical results. I show it for the results in this paper in the second Appendix.
At the empirical level the aggregation of rm-level data to sector-level ones may create
biases, as well. First, in order to aggregate observations at the sector level, it is necessary
to use few statistics that take account of rm productivity distribution, like the mean or the
standard deviation of that distribution. By using rm-level data, instead, we rather take the
actual productivity distribution into account. Second, it may also be the case that rm-level
variables are correlated with sector-level variables included in the regression. In this case using
aggregate sector statistics instead of actual rm-level variables may bias the results31.
4 Data and variable construction
The data set I use has been constructed from four dierent sources. Data on French rm level
characteristics comes from the BRN (B en eces R eels Normaux) data set collected at INSEE
(Institute National de la Statistique et des  Etudes  Economiques). This data set contains, for
dierent years, balance-sheet information of French rms whose turnover is higher than 3,5
millions of francs (about 530.000 euros). The sample accounts for the 60% of all French rms.
Each rm is classied according to 3-digit NES classication that accounts for 60 manufacturing
sectors.
The variables I use from this data set are described hereafter. Labor is a full time-equivalent
measure that accounts for part-time workers and refers to the end of the year. Value added is
dened as the dierence between production and materials. Labor cost (wages) is equal to the
total labor compensation costs. Real capital stock is measured as the ination-adjusted gross
book value of xed assets including construction and other xed assets. Total sales and total
29See for example Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) and Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2008).
30Notice that in this kind of models rm size is a monotonic increasing function of rm productivity.
31In my analysis this may be the case if rms in a sector with high level of comparative advantage are more
productive than those in other sectors. This may be for example the case if, as shown by Bernard, Redding and
Schott (2007), the HO comparative advantage induces a magnication of Ricardian comparative advantage.
20Number of observations per year
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Operating rms 69563 64939 61326 59848 57257 55016
of which exporters 24349 23807 23395 23469 23254 22622
of which exporters to Turkey 2082 2323 2698 2926 3015 2838
as % of operating rms 2.99 3.58 4.4 4.89 5.27 5.16
as % of total exporters 8.55 9.76 11.53 12.47 12.97 12.55
Total production (billion of Francs) 338 351 346 360 372 372
Total exported sales (billion of Francs) 119 130 129 146 155 154
Total exported sales to TK (billion of Francs) 0.842 0.847 1.27 1.54 1.61 1.89
as % of total production 0.25 0.24 0.37 0.43 0.43 0.51
as % of total exported sales 0.71 0.65 0.98 1.05 1.04 1.23
Table 5: Observations in the Sample
sales to export are the balance sheet voices for domestic and total shipped sales (to all countries).
I take all rms in manufacturing industries reported in BRN data set after eliminating the ones
with negative or nil value added, number of workers and capital.
For each rm I then take total export sales and Turkey export sales in dierent years from
DOUANE data set, also available at INSEE, which provides information about sales and export
destination for each exporter. In some cases DOUANE and BRN have dierent information
about the export status of a single rm; I thus eliminate these observations through all the
years.
Table 5 reports numbers of observations in the data set, showing per year number of oper-
ating rms, exporters, exporters to Turkey, as well as total sales to Turkey compared to total
exported sales of French rms. The merged data set contains information on an average of
60.000 rms between 1994 and 1999. The number of rms diers from year to year since some
rms exit the BRN data sets. I consider those rms that exit from the BRN data set as rms
that exited from the market itself. As found in many papers for other countries, the exporters
are a small percentage of overall rms, around one third. Almost the 9% of all exporters export
to Turkey and this percentage increases through time. Sales to Turkey represents around the
0.4% of total French production and 1% of total French exports. This indicates that using a
partial equilibrium environment in analyzing the trade relation between France and Turkey is
the most convenient framework.
Standard statistics for variables used in the analysis are reported in Table 6. It worth
noticing that French rm-level data sets contains information also on very small rms (with
virtually "0" workers or "0" capital).
I next turn to explain how rm productivity is measured in the analysis, being productivity
the main theoretical determinant of rm export status. As a rst measure of productivity I take
the distance between rm and sector average labor productivity (value added per worker)32
. This productivity measure, even if it is only a proxy for total factor productivity, works
quite well throughout the analysis. However, as rm productivity is an important control
variable in regression specications, I also consider more sophisticated and reliable measures of
Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP is usually estimated as a residual of a Cobb-Douglas
32This normalization allows me to take account of the sector component of labor productivity.
21main variables statistics
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dataset rm level variables
workers in log 367949 2.58 1.35 0 11
value added in log 366059 8.09 1.47 0 17.7
capital in log 367949 7.71 1.79 0 17.8
materials in log 347894 8.14 1.81 0 18.9
wage in log 469614 6.54 1.44 0 15.4
Obtained rm level variables
labour productivity 366059 -0.13 0.51 -5.96 5.64
TFP (OP) 366059 0.00 0.47 -5.74 5.16
TFP (OP-SB) 366058 0.00 0.47 -5.72 5.17
Dataset sector level variables
Turkey import taris 1995 58 9.8 7.76 0.5 52
Turkey import taris 1997 58 8.17 10.84 0 67
Turkey import taris 1999 58 7.79 12.12 0.05 77
Obtained sector level variables
US Capital Intensity 57 4.3 0.71 2.49 6
US Skill Intensity 57 0.39 0.13 0.19 0.74
Table 6: Basic Statistics
log-linearized production function. However, as many previous empirical studies argued, this
estimation is biased because of simultaneity and selection biases. The rst bias arises because
rms may adjust one of their production factor (capital) knowing a part of their productivity,
which is unknown by the econometrician. Thus the estimated coecient for capital may be
biased since capital is correlated with an unknown rm level heterogeneous term which is left
in the error term. Selection bias, instead, may arise because in this data set some rms exit
and presumably they are the less productive ones. I thus use Olley and Pakes (1996) semi-
parametric estimation method to measure TFP controlling for both biases33. The simultaneity
bias is taken into account by using an investment function that links capital stocks to capital
ows and by estimating the coecient of capital with a non-parametric technique34. Selection
bias is taken into account by incorporating an estimate of the survival function in the second
non-parametric stage. Table 6 shows some descriptive statistics on TFP estimations as well35.
Data on industry capital and skilled comparative advantage have been obtained using NBER
US-Manufacturing data set. Sector skill-intensity is the ratio of non-production wages over to-
tal wages. Sector capital-intensity is given by capital per worker (taken in logarithms)36. These
are good measures for French comparative advantage with respect to Turkey. The reason is
that France is more skilled- and capital-endowed than Turkey. Thus France has a relative
comparative advantage, with respect to Turkey, in skilled- and capital-intensive sectors. Both
these measures refer to US industries. The idea is to obtain "exogenous" measure of sector
33Pavnick (2002) and Arnold (2005) explain extensively this methodology.
34Levinshon and Petrin (2003) propose a estimation methodology very similar to the Olley and Pakes (1996)
one. It consists in using a function for the demand of intermediate factors (material) instead of an investment
function to correct for the simultaneity bias. They propose this method since in rm-level data sets many
records for investment are zero, thus the Olley and Pakes (1996) method could not be accurate. For French
data set Olley and Pakes (1996) and Levinshon and Petrin (2003) TFP estimates are very correlated. All results
presented in next section are robust to both the TFP measures.
35Notice that correlation among dierent measures is very high.
36Measures in the same fashion have been recently used in Cu~ nat & Melitz (2005), Romalis (2004).
22Sectors at 2-digit NES Turkish Applied Import Taris Dierence in Taris Comp. Adv.
1995 1997 1999 95-97 97-99 US CI* US SI*
Apparel, Textile and Leather Products 18.83 9.22 11.18 -9.61 1.96 2.63 0.29
Furniture and Fixture 9.87 9.34 7.57 -0.529 -1.778 3.48 0.38
Printing and Publishing 8.02 5.16 3.87 -2.865 -1.285 3.65 0.56
Paper, Lumber and Wood Products 6.48 3.63 2.44 -2.848 -1.188 3.73 0.28
Transportation Equipment 6.6 3.14 2.33 -3.46 -0.806 3.84 0.41
Textile Mill Products 11.3 9.14 18.46 -2.166 9.326 3.97 0.24
Mechanic Equipment 5.27 2.85 1.92 -2.419 -0.927 3.98 0.42
Electric and Electronic Equipment 5.53 3.37 2.12 -2.164 -1.251 4.02 0.62
Electric and Electronic Components 7.95 4.21 2.46 -3.742 -1.754 4.17 0.45
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 18.4 30.71 31.07 12.311 0.361 4.27 0.33
Mineral Products 6.45 3.52 2.74 -2.931 -0.777 4.36 0.31
Chemicals and Allied Products 8.96 6.53 6.02 -2.425 -0.514 4.37 0.38
Fabricated Metal Products 12.29 4.23 3.34 -8.063 -0.885 4.47 0.3
Motor Vehicles and Equipment 9.07 6.95 5.55 -2.126 -1.401 4.66 0.21
Drugs, Soaps and Cleaners 7.03 4.16 3.68 -2.87 -0.48 4.8 0.58
*Note: US CI is US Capital Intensity and US SI is US Skill Intensity
Table 7: Comparative advantage measures and taris decrease by 2-digit NES classication
factor intensity: the underlying hypothesis is that US produces at the frontier in every sec-
tor, thus its factor-intensity measures are the "optimal" ones. Table 7 and Figure 3 show the
measures of the capital and skilled labor comparative advantage for 2-digit sector level. French
sector with higher level of comparative advantage with respect to Turkey are "Drugs, Soap
and Cleaners", "Chemicals Products", "Transportation", "Mechanical Equipment" and "Elec-
tric and Electronic Components". As expected Turkey has higher comparative advantage in
traditional sectors like "Apparel, Textile and Leather Products" and "Textile Mills".
Finally Turkish taris against French goods are available in the WTO-TRAINS data set
and they have been described in a previous section of this paper.
The nal data set in this paper reports the information for almost 60,000 rms, active in
57 sectors, in the years 1995, 1997 and 1999.
5 The empirical results
In this section I estimate the model's predictions on the impact of a taris reduction on
French rms' export behavior. The empirical identication is based on a generalized dierence
in dierence methodology where the source of variation is the change in Turkish taris across
57 manufacturing industries (at the 3-digit NES classication) in 3 years (one before the CU:
1995 and two after: 1997, 1999).
I analyze the eect of Customs Union on the following outcome in French rms: probabil-
ity of exporting; probability of exporting taking sector comparative advantage into account;
shipped ows at incumbent rms; shipped ows at incumbent rms taking sector comparative
advantage into account.
23Figure 3: US skill-intensity and capital-intensity
5.1 Extensive margin: the probability to export
The model predicts that a rm will export whenever its productivity is higher than the
export productivity threshold in its sector. The export threshold, in turn, depends positively
on taris. Therefore, when taris decrease some rms, among very productive non-exporters,
enter the export market. This is captured by the following derivative
@'i;x;F
@i;T > 0.
To empirically test this prediction I run the following Linear Probability Model (LPM):
EXP(T)i;j;t = 1j;t + 2'i;j;t 1 + 3Zi;j;t 1 + j + t + i;j;t (16)
where i indexes rms; j indexes 3-digit-NES industries; t indexes time (years 1995, 1997,
1999); EXP(T)i;j;t is a dummy with value 1 if the rm export to Turkey in a given year and
0 otherwise; j;t are Turkish taris toward France imports in each sector and year; 'i;j;t 1 is
rm productivity obtained with dierent measures as discussed in the previous section; Zi;j;t 1
refers to a set of rm time-variant controls which I describe afterward. Along with coecients,
regression 16 estimates a set of industry dummies that controls for unobserved time-invariant
industry characteristics, j, and a set of time-dummies that control for time-varying shocks that
aect all industries proportionately, t. The rst ones are introduced to control for all those
sector characteristics that can aect on average the probability of exporting in each sector,
such a specic xed cost to export, comparative advantage itself, elasticity of substitution
and so on. Introducing them allows me to control for the possibility that the initial level of
Turkish taris had been set to protect Turkey against the competition of specic French (or
European) industries. Time xed eect control for macro-shocks which could explain the change
in probability of exporting besides the specic change in taris. Regression 16 , estimated
with sector xed eect, is a pooled regression in which panel structure is not specied. This
regression, thus, estimates the average eect of taris (or productivity) on the probability of
exporting.
The expected sign of the taris coecient in regression 16 is negative since the probability
to export for a rm in the model is given by the distance between its level of productivity, ',




@ ('   'j;x;F)
@j;T
< 0 ! 1 < 0
These derivatives help us to understand why it is important to control for rm level produc-
tivity in the empirical exercise. Although in the model productivity is held xed through time
for each rm, this is not the case in real world. A rm could change its export status because
of a productivity upgrading in the same period in which taris are reduced. If that upgrade
is spuriously correlated with taris change, by omitting rm productivity, taris coecient is
biased.
Moreover there could be concerns that rms that enter export market become more produc-
tive, thus I introduce one-year lagged rm productivity to control for endogeneity. However, in
this analysis the endogeneity issue is not very likely since most of the rms which decide to enter
the Turkish market after 1996 were already exporters, albeit in other markets. Thus, even if we
are concerned by the existence of potential backward gains -from trade to rm productivity-,
this is not an issue in this case37.
The second important control variable is a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the rm
exports to any other destination besides Turkey the year before and 0 otherwise. Bernard
and Jensen (2004) shows that sunk cost to be an exporter (in any destination) are empirically
relevant. Thus, it may be that a rm that was an exporter albeit not to Turkey could enter
Turkey after the reduction in taris much easier than another rm. If the starting export status
of French rms was correlated with Turkish taris, then, by omitting it, we could have a biased
coecient. Having the information on export status to any other destination I can successfully
control for this potential bias.
Finally other rm level controls are rm size measured as number of workers, rm capital
intensity measured as capital per worker and rm's cost of labor, all introduced in logs. These
variables are mainly introduced to control for other time-variant rm level characteristics which
may be important in the decision of a rm to export. Moreover since measured productivity
doesn't vary so much through time, these variables may capture with more precision rm
dynamic structure.
Results for regression 16 are reported in columns (1) to (5) of Table 8. As expected, a
reduction of Turkish taris increases the average rm's probability of exporting to Turkey. In
the simplest specication, in which I introduce only taris in the right hand side of regression
16 , 1 percentage-point decrease in these increases the probability to export by 0.053 percentage
points. In specication (2) I add Olley and Pakes (1996) TFP estimation of rm productivity
which positively explains the probability to export. In specication (3) I add the export status of
previous year. As expected, if a rm was exporting to any destination except Turkey in previous
year, it exports to Turkey with a higher probability in the current year. Not surprisingly the
rm productivity coecient is now lower, since productivity and export status were expected to
be positively correlated. When I add other rm characteristics the rm-productivity coecient
decreases from 0.030 to 0.017 due to the fact that in column (3) rm productivity was accounting
for all time-variant rm level characteristics.
All the regressions have robust standard errors and are clustered at the 3-digit-NES sector
37There is however another reason to introduce lagged rm level productivity and this is the fact that labor
is measured at the end of the year in my data set, while export refers to any date before the end of the year,
thus introducing a lag gives me a more precise time structure.
25level to take into account possible heteroskedasticity and to relax the hypothesis of independence
of residuals, thus residuals are supposed independent across sectors but not within them.
A last observation regards the choice of using LPM instead of a probit (or a logit). Since
it is necessary to estimate these regressions with xed eects, I am more willing to accept
the problems that a regression with LPM may have (prediction on probability outside the 0-1
range) than the consequences of the incidental parameter problem a probit/logit regressions
have.
Regression 16 may be improved by allowing for the panel structure of the data set and
running the following:
EXP(T)i;j;t = 1j;t + 2'i;j;t 1 + 3Zi;j;t 1 + i + t + i;j;t (17)
which diers from 16 since it accounts for rm unobservable time-invariant heterogeneity
through the introduction of rm, instead of sector, xed eects. Results are reported in columns
(6) to (10) of Table 8. Using 17 instead of 16 improves the results in dierent directions.
First, allowing for rm xed eect, allows me to check for the case that Turkish taris
are correlated with French rm characteristics. Suppose France has a sector with a very few
number of rms with some specic characteristics. Suppose that this sector exports a very high
volume of sales to Turkey. If Turkey set its tari to protect against a specic French sector and
if this sector is mainly composed by few rms, than it is plausible that initial Turkish taris are
correlated with French rm characteristics (at least for some sectors), thus the tari coecient
may be biased. If it exists, this bias is very small since taris coecient in this specication
does not change much.
Second, productivity coecients in 16 are most probably biased since it is plausible that
there are some unobservable rm characteristics (like management quality and so on) which
are positively correlated with productivity. If they are not taken into account the productivity
coecients in columns (2) to (5) of Table 8 will be upwards biased. This seems to be the case
since the estimated coecients for TFP are much smaller when I allow for rm xed eect (from
0.017 of column (4) to 0.007 of column (9)). The same intuition underlies the lower coecient
on past exporting status in this set of regression. Since being an exporter (to any destination)
is very persistent in the data set, the dummy that controls for past export status may be very
correlated with a rm xed eect and this is why this variable is no longer signicant in some
specications of regression 17.
Third, with this specication I can control for a third potential problem, deriving from the
sector disaggregation. The maximum sector disaggregation available in this data set is 3-digit
NES one which consists in 60 manufacturing sectors38. It is plausible that there are sector
characteristics at a more disaggregated level which are correlated with initial level of tari and
that I am not capturing by using only 60 sectors. In this way I allow for unobservable eects
which may be correlated with taris to vary at a much more disaggregated level.
Finally, with this specication, I am taking into account the panel structure of my data
(which I am not doing with the pooled OLS of the previous model). Even if, as long as
individual xed eect are not correlated with our variable of interest, the coecients in the
previous specication are unbiased, still this regression allows for more eciency and for the
specic fact that the mean eect (in the constant) is rm specic rather then constant over all
38These, in turn, becomes 57 in the analysis since 3 sectors are not considered manufacturing ones in the
other data I use
26observations. In column (7) I am looking at the marginal change in probability of exporting
within each rm when taris and rm productivity changes through time. Thus the productivity
coecient is now much smaller. Finally, the coecient of taris is similar to the one estimated
with sector xed eect, albeit more signicant.
27Dependent Variable: export to Turkey
LPM with sector FE (pooled LPM) LPM with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Turkey import taris -0.053 -0.051 -0.046 -0.044 -0.044 -0.081 -0.044 -0.044 -0.042 -0.041
(5.55)*** (2.04)** (1.98)* (1.78)* (1.75)* (5.55)*** (7.02)*** (7.00)*** (6.58)*** (6.55)***
rm TFP (OP) 0.043 0.03 0.017 0.005 0.005 0.007
(5.45)*** (4.58)*** (2.93)*** (4.17)*** (4.13)*** (3.69)***
rm TFP (OP-SB) 0.017 0.007
(2.88)*** (3.72)***
exporter to OD 0.092 0.034 0.034 0.002 0.001 0.001
(8.31)*** (7.41)*** (7.37)*** (2.35)** -1 -1
rm size 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009
-1.25 -1.17 (4.30)*** (4.32)***
rm capital intensity 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.004
(6.36)*** (6.38)*** (3.78)*** (3.75)***
rm wage level 0.016 0.015 0.004 0.003
(2.42)** (1.94)* (1.69)* (1.67)*
N observations 183686 183686 183686 183681 183681 183686 183686 183686 183681 183681
R2 0.05 0.06 0.1 0.16 0.16
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector dummies YES YES YES YES YES
Note:Plant-level regression. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES industry level classication.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy taking value of 1 if the plant exports to Turkey and 0 otherwise.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 8: Probability of Exporting to Turkey: LPM with sector and rm xed-eect
2
85.2 Extensive margin: testing the comparative advantage hypothe-
sis
I now turn to test the second and new prediction of my model: the eect of a tari's
reduction on the probability of exporting is higher for rms in sector with lower comparative
advantage. This is captured by the following derivative:
@2'i;x;F
@j;T@i < 0.
To test empirically this prediction I run the following Linear Probability Models (LPM):
EXP(T)i;j;t = 1j;t + 2j;tCAj + 3'i;j;t 1 + 4Zi;j;t 1 + j + t + i;j;t (18)
EXP(T)i;j;t = 1j;t + 2j;tCAj + 3'i;j;t 1 + 4Zi;j;t 1 + i + t + i;j;t (19)
where the rst is a pooled OLS model with industry xed eects and the second a panel
FE model. Notice that the dierence with respect to specications 16 and 17 lies in the
introduction of an interacted term between the taris and the comparative advantage index.
This specication thus allows for the eect of taris to be dierent across sectors according to
the measure of capital or skilled intensity. All other variables introduced in these regressions
are the same ones I used in specication 16 and 17, which I discussed earlier.
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39Notice that there is an abuse of notation since  sub-indexed with i indicates the theoretical comparative
advantage and  sub-indexed with a number indicates the coecients of the regressions.
29Dependent Variable: export to Turkey
LPM with sector FE (pooled) LPM with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Turkey import taris -0.353 -0.369 -0.372 -0.331 -0.252 -0.274 -0.275 -0.264
(2.39)** (2.60)** (2.63)** (2.49)** (3.94)*** (4.29)*** (4.30)*** (4.12)***
*US Capital Intensity 0.073 0.078 0.078 0.068 0.05 0.056 0.056 0.053
(2.11)** (2.31)** (2.35)** (2.17)** (3.36)*** (3.75)*** (3.77)*** (3.57)***
rm TFP (OP) 0.03 0.017 0.006 0.007
(4.52)*** (2.90)*** (4.23)*** (3.77)***
rm TFP (OP-SB) 0.018 0.007
(2.89)*** (3.81)***
rm labor productivity 0.023 0.007
(5.07)*** (3.72)***
exporter to OD 0.093 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.001
(8.21)*** (7.28)*** (7.24)*** (7.21)*** (2.36)** (1.00) (1.00) (1.01)
rm size 0.008 0.009 0.02 0.009 0.009 0.011
-1.23 -1.16 (4.28)*** (4.30)*** (4.33)*** (4.42)***
rm capital intensity 0.016 0.016 0.012 0.005 0.004 0.003
(6.34)*** (6.36)*** (5.78)*** (3.84)*** (3.82)*** (2.67)***
rm wage level 0.016 0.015 0.01 0.004 0.004 0.004
(2.37)** (1.88)* (1.76)* (1.72)* (1.69)* (1.77)*
N observations 180585 180580 180580 180580 180585 180580 180580 180580
R2 0.1 0.16 0.16 0.16 YES YES YES YES
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 YES YES YES YES
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector dummies YES YES YES YES
Note:Plant-level regression. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES industry level classication.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy taking value of 1 if the plant exports to Turkey and 0 otherwise.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 9: Probability of Exporting to Turkey: LPM with Capital Intensity, sector and rm xed-eect
3
0Figure 4: Estimated Probability of Exporting by Capital Intensity
Results of regressions 18 and 19 are reported in Table 9. The coecients of interest are
signicant in all specications and of the expected sign. Table 10 reports the results of regres-
sions 18 and 19 using skilled comparative advantage measure instead of capital comparative
advantage one. In this case only the model with rm xed eect yields signicant coecients.
The eect of taris reduction on the probability of exporting for dierent percentiles of
capital and skill comparative advantage is reported in Table 13 and in Figure 4 (for capital
intensity only)40. In column (2) I reported the average estimation obtained in regression 17,
according to which a decrease of 1 percentage points of taris increase the probability of ex-
porting of a rm by 0.042 percentage points. However, if we allow for the eect depending on
the comparative advantage, we nd that the probability of exporting increase by 0.135 percent-
age points in a sector in the 1st low percentile of capital comparative advantage and by 0.012
percentage points in a sector in the 75th percentile of capital comparative advantage. Thus,
just as indicated in the descriptive analysis, the eect of the taris reduction on the probability
of exporting has been higher for sectors without comparative advantage. A similar result holds
for the skilled comparative advantage measure as reported in column (4) even if with a smaller
magnitude. A caveat to these results is that the eect of taris for sectors whose capital (or
skilled) comparative advantage is above the 75th percentile41 becomes positive.
40Columns (3) and (4) of Table 13 report respectively the estimated coecients for regressions in column (6)
of Table 9 and column (5) in Table 10.
41This may be given by the rigid structure I used in 18 and 19 to account for comparative advantage, which
I may relax by dividing sectors in dierent groups dened by their comparative advantage ranking.
31Dependent Variable: export to Turkey
LPMl with sector FE (pooled) LPM with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Turkey import taris -0.134 -0.137 -0.134 -0.137 -0.127 -0.126
-1.13 -1.11 -1.08 (5.13)*** (4.73)*** (4.69)***
* US Skill Intensity 0.249 0.263 0.257 0.265 0.243 0.241
-0.84 -0.87 -0.84 (3.74)*** (3.41)*** (3.38)***
rm TFP (OP) 0.03 0.017 0.006 0.007
(4.53)*** (2.90)*** (4.07)*** (3.63)***
rm TFP (OP-SB) 0.017 0.007
(2.87)*** (3.65)***
exporter to OD 0.093 0.034 0.034 0.002 0.001 0.001
(8.21)*** (7.27)*** (7.23)*** (2.31)** -0.98 -0.98
rm size 0.008 0.009 0.009 0.009
-1.24 -1.16 (4.22)*** (4.23)***
rm capital intensity 0.016 0.016 0.004 0.004
(6.34)*** (6.36)*** (3.76)*** (3.74)***
rm wage level 0.016 0.015 0.004 0.004
(2.38)** (1.89)* (1.65)* -1.64
N observations 180585 180580 180580 180585 180580 180580
R2 0.1 0.16 0.16
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector dummies YES YES YES NO NO NO
Note:Plant-level regression. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis) adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy taking value of 1 if the plant exports to Turkey and 0 otherwise.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 10: Probability of Exporting to Turkey: LPM with Skill Intensity, sector and rm xed-
eect
32Dependent Variable: export to Morocco
OLS with rm FE (panel) OLS with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Turkey import taris -0.147 -0.148 -0.034 -0.032 -0.049 -0.05 -0.012 -0.011
(1.71)* (1.75)* -0.37 -0.34 -0.69 -0.7 -0.37 -0.34
* US capital Intensity 0.032 0.033 0.01 0.011
-1.56 -1.6 -0.63 -0.64
* US skill Intensity 0.066 0.062 0.017 0.015
-0.29 -0.27 -0.2 -0.17
rm TFP (OP) 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.007
(2.13)** (2.12)** (3.29)*** (3.27)***
rm TFP (OP-SB) 0.011 0.011 0.007 0.007
(1.93)* (1.91)* (3.29)*** (3.27)***
exporter to OD 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.084 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
(9.82)*** (9.83)*** (9.82)*** (9.83)*** (4.74)*** (4.74)*** (4.74)*** (4.74)***
rm size 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
-0.36 -0.32 -0.36 -0.32 (5.89)*** (5.89)*** (5.88)*** (5.87)***
rm capital intensity 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(5.76)*** (5.61)*** (5.76)*** (5.61)*** (3.07)*** (3.04)*** (3.06)*** (3.03)***
rm wage level 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.028 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
(3.69)*** (3.07)*** (3.70)*** (3.07)*** -1.51 -1.52 -1.5 -1.51
N observations 180580 180580 180580 180580 180580 180580 180580 180580
R2 0.19 0.19 0.19 0.19
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector dummies YES YES YES YES NO NO NO NO
Note:Plant-level regression. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Dependent variable is a dummy taking value of 1 if the plant exports to Morocco and 0 otherwise.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 11: Control Experiment with Morocco: LPM with sector and rm xed eects
3
3As a robustness check that previous results are not driven by sector-trends that might be
correlated with taris I perform a series of control experiments. These consisted in running
regressions 18 and 19 using, as dependent variable, the probability of French rms of exporting
to dierent countries (Morocco, Romania, Hungary, Algeria, Italy, China, Russia) or to dierent
groups of countries (any country, any country except Turkey). If my results on Turkey come
from time-varying industry trends which are spuriously correlated with import Turkish taris
change, then those control experiments should deliver the same results I found for Turkey.
Table 11 shows detailed results for Morocco. Table 12 indicates for dierent models and
dierent dependent variables if Turkish taris and Turkish taris interacted with a comparative
advantage measure are statistically signicant with the expected sign (v), statistically signicant
with the opposite sign (s) or not statistically signicant (x). Both these Tables show that in
almost all these control experiments we do not nd the same eect we nd for Turkey. This
conrms the robustness of previous results.
5.3 Intensive margin: sales to Turkey for continuing exporters
The model predicts that those rms that were exporting to Turkey before the reduction in
taris will begin to export higher quantities after the Customs Union formation. This prediction
is estimated by the following regressions:
qi;j;t = 1j;t + 2'i;j;t 1 + 3hijt + 4Zi;j;t 1 + j + t + i;j;t (20)
qi;j;t = 1j;t + 2'i;j;t 1 + 3hijt + 4Zi;j;t 1 + i + t + i;j;t (21)
where the dependent variable is the logarithm of sales to Turkey of each rm in each period
of time (1995, 1997 and 1999), hi;j;t is the logarithm of sales to all other export markets and
the rest is as in regressions 18 and 19. As before regression 20 controls for sector xed eects,
so it is a pooled OLS regression. Regression 21 controls for rms time-invariant unobserved
heterogeneity and is panel estimation with xed eects.
Results are reported in Table 14. Notice that the number of observations is now reduced
to 4020 rms: the once that were exporting to Turkey from 1995 on. The rst four columns
report results for regression 20 with and without time xed eects, while the last four columns
report the analogue results for the panel specication, regression 2142.
42I tried a dierent specication using the ratio of sales to Turkey on sales to all other destinations as
dependent variable. Results on Turkey's import taris are similar to the ones reported.
34Dependent Variable: export to each of the following country
LPM (sector FE) LPM (rm FE) LPM (sector FE) LPM (rm FE)
Capital Intensity Skill Intensity
tari tari*CI tari tari*CI tari tari*SI tari tari*SI
Turkey v v v v x x v v
Morocco v x x x x x x x
Romania x x v v x x v x
Hungary v x v x x x v x
Algeria x x x x x x x x
Italy v v x x x x x x
China x x x x x x x x
Russia v v v v x x v x
All the world x x s s x x s s
All the world (no TK) x x s s x x s s
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NO NO NES 3 NES 3 NO NO
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
sector dummies YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
rm dummies NO NO YES YES NO NO YES YES
Note:V indicates that the coecient is signicant and of the expected sign
X indicates a not-signicant coecient;
s indicates a signicant coecient but with the opposite sign.
Table 12: Summary of Control Experiments: LPM with sector and rm xed eects
Estimated eects of a reduction of taris by 1 p.p.
on the probability of exporting to Turkey
1 2 3 4
percentiles average over Capital Intensity over Skill Intensity
1% 0.04% 0.14% 0.08%
5% 0.04% 0.10% 0.07%
10% 0.04% 0.08% 0.07%
25% 0.04% 0.06% 0.06%
50% 0.04% 0.04% 0.04%
75% 0.04% 0.01% 0.02%
90% 0.04% -0.03% -0.02%
95% 0.04% -0.04% -0.03%
99% 0.04% -0.05% -0.06%
Table 13: Estimated change in probability of exporting to Turkey by Capital Intensity and Skill
Intensity percentiles
35Dependent Variable: exported sales to Turkey (in logs)
Pooled OLS with sector FE OLS with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Turkey import taris -0.18 -0.22 -2.92 -2.81 -0.27 -0.27 -3.13 -2.73
-0.45 -0.52 (1.99)* (1.99)* -0.46 -0.47 (4.44)*** (4.00)***
rm TFP (OP) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.15 0.14 0.09
(2.18)** (1.96)* (2.13)** -1.64 -1.5 -1.38 -1.28 -0.76
exported sales to OD (in logs) 0.61 0.52 0.61 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.5 0.44
(18.80)*** (8.37)*** (18.96)*** (8.46)*** (5.25)*** (4.83)*** (7.44)*** (6.24)***
rm size -0.17 -0.24 -0.09 -0.46
-0.99 -1.37 -0.44 (2.23)**
rm capital intensity 0.15 0.16 0.07 0.3
(2.73)*** (2.81)*** -0.68 (2.97)***
rm wage level 0.1 0.16 0.13 0.4
-0.59 -0.9 -0.73 (2.08)**
N observations 4020 4019 4020 4019 4020 4019 4020 4019
R2 0.4 0.41 0.39 0.4
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
sector dummies YES YES YES YES
Note:Plant-level regression for continuing exporters. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 14: Intensive Margin for Continuing Exporters (1): OLS with sector and rm FE
3
6When I include time dummies (columns (1), (2), (5) and (6)), Turkish import taris are not
signicantly dierent from zero in any specication. However without year dummies we nd
that a decrease in taris of 1 percentage points increases the exported quantity for an average
exporter by a big 3%. This could be the case if taris are taking all the eect coming from
time macro-shock. This may be an indication of the fact that exporters were sensitive to the
entrance of Turkey in European Customs Union but not specically to the reduction in taris.
The intuition is strengthened by the fact that I control all regressions with the contemporaneous
rm export to all other destination except Turkey. This variable captures the eect of a macro-
shock on each French rm regarding its behavior with respect to all destinations except Turkey.
The taris coecient captures the remaining eect of a time macro-shock on Turkey ows.
This may suggest that the time varying component of the taris (or of another eect that came
along the CU like non- taris barriers) is much stronger than the across sector component, thus
time dummies capture all the eects once I include them 43.
This interpretation leads to the following tentative conclusions. Although, the intensive
margin has been sensitive to the entry of Turkey in European CU, the channel didn't work
through taris reduction. But instead through other changes, mainly at aggregate level, that
taris capture improperly. Second, if we are willing to believe the previous conclusion, then the
magnitude of the CU on the intensive margin has been much bigger than that on the extensive
margin, as the decomposition in the initial section showed 44. Third, even if, on average, more
productive rms export big volumes to Turkey (as I nd in specication with pooled OLS), the
marginal change of productivity within each rm does not help in explaining the increase in
those volumes(as it is clear in panel specications). Also in the case of productivity changes it
seems that the extensive margin is more reactive than the intensive margin.
Finally, results on coecients in column (8) on other rms' characteristics seem interesting.
Here I nd that a rm that decreases its size (number of workers) but increases its capital
intensity and its cost of labor (which is a measure of the level of wages) exports more to
Turkey. The opposite sign on size and wage coecient may be an indication of skill adoption
by those rms. It is possible that these rms are decreasing their labor force but increasing
paid wages since they are upgrading the skill prole of their workers. Anyway this is only a
possible explanation. A more formal analysis is needed to investigate this intuition 45.
5.4 Intensive margin and comparative advantage
What about the response of rms in sectors with dierent comparative advantage indexes?
The model predicts that the eect of taris on rm export revenues should be higher if the rm
is in a sector which enjoys a higher level of comparative advantage with respect to Turkey. I
estimate this prediction with the following regressions:
qi;j;t = 1j;t + 2j;tCAj + 3'i;j;t 1 + 4hijt + 5Zi;j;t 1 + i + t + i;j;t (22)
43I thank Paula Bustos to make me notice this.
44In fact decompositions in section 1 describes how the trade margins moved in the years before and after
the CU, but do not assess the causal relation which is found in this econometric session using the variation of
taris for the identication. The nding in this section are consistent with those ndings.
45Bustos (2008) shows that as a consequence of trade liberalization, rms increase their technology adoption
(which in turn could imply higher skill-premium).
37I estimate this, as before with sector and rm xed eects and with capital- as well as
skill-intensity. In terms of regression 22 the predictions of the model translates in the following
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Results for capital- and skill-intensity measures are reported, respectively, in tables 15 and
16 . The rst table claries that capital-intensity has a role only in those panel regressions
without time dummies and the eect, only signicant at 10%, has an opposite sign with respect
to the model's predictions. Skill-intensity, instead, does not help to explain the variation of sales
to Turkey. Table 17 shows the magnitude of the eect of regression 22 for the two measures
of comparative advantage at dierent percentiles46. Column (3) shows that for a rm in a
sector with very low capital-intensity (1st percentile) a decrease of taris of 1 percentage point
increases the exported ows to Turkey of 5.49%, while a rm in a high capital-intensity sector
(99th percentile) increases its ows to Turkey by 0.35%. Again the average eect of 3% hides
a heterogeneous eect which is signicantly linked to sector factor-intensities. Finally column
(4) shows the result, albeit not signicantly dierent from zero, using skill-intensity.
46These predictions refer to regressions in column (8) of Table 15 and in column (8) of Table 16.
38Dependent Variable: exported sales to Turkey (in logs)
Pooled OLS with sector FE OLS with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Turkey import taris -2.9 -3.17 -7.76 -7.89 -4.39 -4.45 -9.3 -9.06
-1.36 -1.42 -1.62 (1.71)* -1.34 -1.35 (2.68)*** (2.62)***
* US Capital Intensity 0.66 0.71 1.17 1.23 1 1.01 1.5 1.53
-1.31 -1.36 -0.92 -1 -1.29 -1.3 (1.75)* (1.82)*
rm TFP (OP) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.1
(2.19)** (1.96)* (2.16)** -1.66 -1.55 -1.42 -1.36 -0.84
exported sales to OD (in logs) 0.61 0.52 0.61 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.5 0.44
(18.76)*** (8.33)*** (18.84)*** (8.39)*** (5.23)*** (4.81)*** (7.39)*** (6.19)***
rm size -0.17 -0.24 -0.09 -0.46
-0.98 -1.36 -0.46 (2.22)**
rm capital intensity 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.31
(2.69)*** (2.77)*** -0.7 (2.99)***
rm wage level 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.4
-0.59 -0.9 -0.74 (2.06)**
N observations 4002 4001 4002 4001 4002 4001 4002 4001
R2 0.4 0.41 0.39 0.4
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
sector dummies YES YES YES YES
Note:Plant-level regression for continuing exporters. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 15: Intensive Margin for Continuing Exporters (2): Capital Intensity, OLS with sector and rm FE
3
9Dependent Variable: exported sales to Turkey (in logs)
Pooled OLS with sector FE OLS with rm FE (panel)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Turkey import taris -1.25 -1.29 0.39 -0.07 -1.44 -1.52 0.48 -0.82
-0.69 -0.68 -0.08 -0.02 -0.6 -0.63 -0.18 -0.31
* US skill Intensity 3.06 3.06 -9.1 -7.55 3.33 3.54 -9.98 -5.32
-0.64 -0.62 -0.66 -0.57 -0.51 -0.54 -1.29 -0.7
rm TFP (OP) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.08
(2.17)** (1.96)* (2.10)** -1.62 -1.5 -1.38 -1.2 -0.71
exported sales to OD (in logs) 0.61 0.52 0.61 0.53 0.36 0.34 0.49 0.44
(18.80)*** (8.35)*** (18.98)*** (8.45)*** (5.26)*** (4.84)*** (7.21)*** (6.17)***
rm size -0.17 -0.24 -0.09 -0.45
-0.98 -1.34 -0.45 (2.20)**
rm capital intensity 0.15 0.15 0.07 0.29
(2.69)*** (2.77)*** -0.69 (2.81)***
rm wage level 0.11 0.16 0.14 0.4
-0.59 -0.89 -0.74 (2.06)**
N observations 4002 4001 4002 4001 4002 4001 4002 4001
R2 0.4 0.41 0.39 0.4
Cluster NES 3 NES 3 NES 3 NES 3
Robust CI YES YES YES YES YES YES YES YES
year dummies YES YES NO NO YES YES NO NO
sector dummies YES YES YES YES
Note:Plant-level regression for continuing exporters. Robust t-statistics (in parenthesis)adjusted for clustering at the 3-digit NES.
***:signicant at the 1% level; **:signicant at the 5% level; *: signicant at the 10% level.
Constant and dummies coecient are not reported.
Table 16: Intensive Margin for Continuing Exporters (3): Skill Intensity, OLS with sector and rm FE
4
0Estimated eects of a reduction of taris by 1 p.p.
exported sales to Turkey
1 2 3 4
percentiles average over Capital Intensity over Skill Intensity
1% 3% 5.49% 1.83%
5% 3% 4.45% 1.99%
10% 3% 4.08% 2.04%
25% 3% 3.38% 2.36%
50% 3% 2.83% 2.74%
75% 3% 2.14% 3.16%
90% 3% 1.08% 4.07%
95% 3% 0.76% 4.22%
99% 3% 0.35% 4.81%
Table 17: Estimated change in exported ows to Turkey by Capital Intensity and Skill Intensity
percentiles
6 Conclusions
In this paper I analyze how the reduction of Turkey's import taris, followed the entry of
Turkey in EU Customs Union, aected French rms in their decision to begin exporting to
Turkey or to adjust their exported sales there. I rst estimate these eects for the average
French rm taking into account its productivity, as well as other time-variant characteristics. I
then estimate how taris aect rms decision depending on the comparative advantage (capital-
or skill-intensity) of their sectors.
On the extensive margin I nd that a 1 percentage-point decrease of Turkey's import taris
increases the probability of exporting to Turkey by 0.042 percentage points. However when I
allow for the eect to be asymmetric across sectors I nd that the change in the probability
of exporting induced by the taris decrease, is inversely correlated to the capital (or skill)
comparative advantage.
This rst nding is new and puzzling if we have in mind neoclassical models of trade with
comparative advantage. Those models show that in open economy each country trade mostly
the goods produced by its comparative advantage sectors for a given level of taris. My ndings
however do not refer to an average eect, but to marginal eect. I show that a model that
introduces sector comparative advantage (in a Heckscher-Ohlin fashion) in a partial equilibrium
setting a la Melitz (2003) can predict my ndings along the extensive margin.
On the trade intensive margin (i.e. ows by continuing exporters) the empirical results
are weaker. Turkish import taris have an eect of exported volumes by French rms only in
those regressions without time-dummies, which control for macro-shocks. The eect, however,
is quite big: a 1 percentage-point reduction of taris increases French exports by 3%. Moreover,
under the same caveat, I show that previous eect is bigger for rms in less capital intensive
sectors. This last nding is, however, at odds with theoretical predictions of my model. Taken
as a whole, the results on intensive margin, suggest that the Customs Union had a strong eect
on French volumes to Turkey but not along the channel of the taris' change. These, in turn,
explained signicantly the attitude of rms to export or not in Turkey.
This second nding, which would need further investigation, could be linked to the empirical
adjustment eects which a static standard model does not address. From the supply side it may
be that rms, in the presence of a Customs Union, may evaluate exporting to Turkey as the
41most important decision foreseeing a further liberalization and an increase in competitiveness
in Turkey. From the demand side, it may be that Turkish demand, after the CU, has been
more directed to consume new varieties (i.e. goods from dierent rms) than to consume higher
quantities of old (already imported) ones. Probably in the years just after the Customs Union
this demand-driven eect explains the dierent movement along the intensive and the extensive
margin of French rms. Finally, results of this paper suggest that heterogeneity across sectors,
associated with heterogeneity across rms, are both important in assessing the consequences of
taris reduction and in enhancing our understanding of trade.
This paper could be improved and extended in many directions. First, a broader experiment
using change in import taris from many countries may be helpful to generalize the ndings.
An extension could be to analyze the eect of the multilateral taris reduction induced by the
formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 on the export market participation
of French rms.
Second, from a theoretical point of view the analysis suggests that extending a standard
model of rm heterogeneity to the inclusion of sector characteristics is a fruitful area for future
research.
42A Predictions of the model





































which holds given that Skill Premium is lower in France than in Turkey.






















Starting from equation 14 we obtain the following predictions:
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which holds since  > 1 and
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which holds given that Skill Premium is lower in France than in Turkey. Finally the cross
derivative is the following:
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B Threshold and mass eect
What are model predictions if we aggregate the results at the sector level? Suppose we do
not observe the productivity of each rm in each sector but we know only the rm productivity
distribution and we estimate the extensive margin looking at the number of exporters in each
sector. In this case the change in taris could be decomposed into a "mass" and a "threshold"
eect, which, as I will show, move in opposite direction when the productivity distribution is
skewed toward the left as the Pareto47one.
The total number of exporters is given by the area lying below the productivity distribution
on the right of the export-threshold:
47The Pareto distribution has been extensively used in empirical studies on this literature since it describes






where N is the mass of active rms, (') is a generic distribution function, the threshold
'x() is indicated as a function of taris and the upper limit of integration h changes according
to the distribution function we choose. The underlined hypothesis of the formula above is that
the productivity distribution of rms does not change with taris (which is a good hypothesis






thus h for Pareto is innity. In this case we could better express the number of exporters

















where the rst integral sum up to N since (') is a density function.


















where the last equality derives from the fact that the productivity distribution is not a
function of taris and the rst term is the generic distribution function evaluated at 'x().
Last formula exactly separates the distribution eect from the threshold one. Let's consider for
example the eect of a tari reduction on the total amount of rms when their productivity is
distributed according to a uniform distribution compared to a Pareto one. The results are the

















From results in previous section of the appendix we know that the threshold eect with
respect to taris is always positive (if taris decreases the export threshold decreases as well),
but now it's clear that the way rms' productivity is distributed may have a role as well. In
fact with a Pareto distribution function the marginal eect of taris on the number of exporters
depends on the starting level of the threshold. In fact if we derive last expressions also w.r.t.
comparative advantage (indicated by CA) we nd:
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In both previous expressions we can separate a distribution eect (which is constant for
Uniform distribution function and positive for the Pareto distribution function) and a threshold
eect (which is negative in both cases). With the Pareto distribution function we can moreover
show that the positive eect dominates. Thus empirically we need to test for the actual rm
productivity distribution function to uncover the eect of taris reduction on the probability
to export for rms in heterogeneous sectors.
C List of sectors
All the manufacturing sectors are included in the analysis except sectors FS, FT and FV
because taris are never reported for these sectors in the TRAINS-WTO database.
45BA Industrie des viandes Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products
BB Industrie du lait Manufacture of dairy products
BC Industrie des boissons Manufacture of beverages
BD Travail du grain ; fabrication d'aliments pour ani-
maux
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products, prepared
animal feeds
BE Industries alimentaires diverses Manufacture of other food products
BF Industrie du tabac Manufacture of tobacco products
CA Industrie de l'habillement et des fourrures Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur
CB Industrie du cuir et de la chaussure Manufacture of leather and leather products and footwear
CC Edition, imprimerie, reproduction Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media
CD Industrie pharmaceutique Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical prod-
ucts
CE Fabrication de savons, de parfums et de produits
d'entretien
Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations,
perfumes and toilet preparations
CF Fabrication de meubles Manufacture of furniture
CG Bijouterie et fabrication d'instruments de musique Manufacture of jewellery and musical instruments
CH Fabrication d'articles de sport, de jeux et industries
diverses
Manufacture of sports goods, games, toys and others n.e.c.
CI Fabrication d'appareils domestiques Manufacture of domestic appliances
CJ Fabrication d'appareils de r eception, d'en-
registrement et de reproduction (son, image)
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or
reproducing apparatus and associated goods
CK Fabrication de mat eriel optique et photographique,
horlogerie
Manufacture of optical instruments, photographic equipment, watches and
clocks
DA Construction automobile Manufacture of motor vehicles, bodies and trailers
Table 18: 3-digit NES classication
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6DB Fabrication d' equipements automobiles Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles
EA Construction navale Building and repairing of ships and boats
EB Construction de mat eriel ferroviaire roulant Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
EC Construction a eronautique et spatiale Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
ED Fabrication de cycles, motocycles, mat eriel de trans-
port n.c.a.
Manufacture of motorcycles, bicycles and other transport equipment n.e.c.
EE Fabrication d' el ements en m etal pour la construc-
tion
Manufacture of structural metal products
EF Chaudronnerie, fabrication de r eservoirs m etalliques
et de chaudi eres
Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs, containers of metal ; manufacture of
central heating radiators and boilers and steam generators
EG Fabrication d' equipements m ecaniques Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power
EH Fabrication de machines d'usage g en eral Manufacture of other general purpose machinery
EI Fabrication de machines agricoles Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery
EJ Fabrication de machines-outils Manufacture of machine tools
EK Fabrication d'autres machines d'usage sp e-cique Manufacture of other special purpose machinery
EL Fabrication d'armes et de munitions Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
EM Fabrication de machines de bureau et de mat eriel
informatique
Manufacture of oce machinery and computers
EN Fabrication de moteurs, g en eratrices et transforma-
teurs  electriques
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
EO Fabrication d'appareils d' emission et de transmis-
sion
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line
telephony and line telegraphy
EP Fabrication de mat eriel m edicochirurgical et
d'orthop edie
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appli-
ances
EQ Fabrication de mat eriel de mesure et de contr^ ole Manufacture of industrial process control equipment, instruments and ap-
pliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating
Table 18: 3-digit NES classication (continued)
4
7FA Extraction de minerais m etalliques Mining of metal ores
FB Autres industries extractives Other mining and quarrying
FC Fabrication de verre et d'articles en verre Manufacture of glass and glass products
FD Fabrication de produits c eramiques et de mat eriaux
de construction
Manufacture of ceramic goods, products for construction purposes and
other non-metallic mineral products
FE Filature et tissage Preparation and spinning of textile bres, weaving and nishing of textiles
FF Fabrication de produits textiles Manufacture of textile articles, except apparel
FG Fabrication d' etoes et d'articles maille Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics and articles
FH Travail du bois et fabrication d'articles en bois Manufacture of wood and wood products
FI Fabrication de p^ ate papier, de papier et de carton Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
FJ Fabrication d'articles en papier ou en carton Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard
FK Industrie chimique min erale Manufacture of basic inorganic chemicals
FL Industrie chimique organique Manufacture of basic organic chemicals
FM Parachimie Manufacture of agro-chemical products, paints and other chemical prod-
ucts
FN Fabrication de bres articielles ou synth etiques Manufacture of man-made bres
FO Industrie du caoutchouc Manufacture of rubber products
FP Transformation des mati eres plastiques Manufacture of plastic products
FQ Sid erurgie et premi ere transformation de l'acier First processing of iron and steel
FR Production de m etaux non ferreux Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
FS Fonderie Casting of metals
FT Services industriels du travail des m etaux Industrial services for treatment of metals
FU Fabrication de produits m etalliques Manufacture of fabricated metal products
FV Rcup eration Recycling
FW Fabrication de mat eriel  electrique Manufacture of electrical equipments and apparatus n.e.c.
FX Fabrication de composants  electroniques Manufacture of electronic valves, tubes and other electronic components
Table 18: 3-digit NES classication (continued)
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